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JANUSZ A. ORDOVER*
I
INTRODUCTION
An economist is likely to view the major U.S. antitrust statutes, such as the
Sherman Act or the Clayton Act, as laws concerned with the effects of
particular business conduct and practices on competition and consumer
welfare. These statutes were adopted by the United States Congress in 1890
and 1914, respectively, when the intensity and the dimensions of competition
in the United States, and hence consumer welfare, were being defined
primarily, if not exclusively, by the activities of American firms. Essential
international trade data fully support this view of competition.' At the end of
the nineteenth century the value of U.S. imports amounted to $850 million in
current dollars. Viewed from another vantage point, U.S. imports then
amounted to 4.5% of the Gross National Product (GNP). These imports
consisted primarily of crude materials, such as raw silk, coffee, and sugar, and
semi and finished manufactured goods, such as wood pulp, copper bars, wool
products, and newsprint. Finally, but equally important, the United States
was running a comfortable balance of trade surplus. 2 By 1950, when the
Celler-Kefauver Act3 amended section 7 of the original Clayton Act, the
United States was the paramount industrial power in the free world. Its
international trade activity, however, was still quite limited. In 1950 imports
amounted to $8.9 billion in current dollars, and constituted a mere 3% of the
Gross National Product. Again, as in the late nineteenth century, business
rivalry and competition in the United States were predominantly a "domestic
affair." 4
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2. In 1900, domestic exports exceeded general imports by $521 million in current dollars.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BICENTENNIAL EDITION: HISTORICAL STATISTICS
OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, at 890 (1975).
3. Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982).
4. Id. Data presented in R. RAPP., TRADE WARFARE AND THE NEW PROTECTIONISM (1986), shows
that in 1929, foreign trade, which equals exports plus imports, amounted to about eight percent of
the GNP. By 194 1, this ratio declined to five percent and stayed at or below ten percent from 1949
through 1969. By 1984, this ratio approached twenty percent.
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Business rivalry is no longer simply a domestic American affair. In the past
decade, international trade has come to play an increasingly significant role in
the U.S. economy. The staggering balance of trade deficits have now reached
$160 billion annually. Repeated calls have emerged for protectionist policies
designed to insulate American firms from "unfair and excessive" foreign
competition and to wring trade concessions and better access to foreign
markets for U.S. exporters. Both have become daily front-page news items.
In 1985 exports of goods and services were $362.3 billion (1982 dollars),
imports had reached $470.5 billion (1982 dollars), and together these
comprised 23% of the U.S. GNP. 5 In key sectors of the economy, imports
have captured a substantial share of the U.S. market. For example, in 1972,
the import penetration ratios 6 were 13.6% for motor vehicles and car bodies,
9.8% for steel supply, 7% for apparels and other textile products, and 7.6%
for electrical and electronic equipment. By 1982, the import penetration
ratios for these products had risen to 26.7%, 17.2%, 20%, and 16%,
respectively. At the end of 1985, the import penetration ratios for capital
goods and consumer goods in general were 30.1% and 11.3%, respectively. 7
In this new environment, the activity of American firms no longer solely or
even predominantly defines the intensity and dimensions of competition.
Rather, it is the strategic interactions of both domestic and foreign firms,
including potential foreign entrants, which determine market rivalry.
Consequently antitrust policy-or to use a more descriptive term,
"competition policy"-must now take into account the realities of
international trade and rivalry. However, accomplishing this shift in policy
considerations will not be a simple matter.
The drafters of the 1982 and 1984 Department of Justice (DOJ) Merger
Guidelines have undertaken perhaps the most valiant effort in this direction.
These DOJ guidelines attempt to design market definition procedures in
merger cases that would best reflect the constraining role of foreign firms,
products, and technology in maintaining competition in the U.S. economy. 8
Still, many major areas of policy remain unexplored and unresolved. The use
of U.S. antitrust laws (competition policy) to regulate the conduct of foreign
5. Imports alone accounted for 13% of GNP in 1985. BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE Survey of Current Business (Aug. 1986).
6. Import penetration refers to the ratio of imports to new supply (domestic product shipments
plus imports) as defined by the BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1986 U.S.
INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK 19 (table 6) [hereinafter 1986 INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK].
7. The capital goods import penetration ratio is constructed by dividing merchandise imports
of capital goods, excluding autos and trucks, by producers' durable equipment expenditures. The
import penetration ratio for consumer goods is constructed by dividing imports of consumer goods,
excluding food and autos, by personal consumption expenditures less food and motor vehicle
expenditures. Johnson, US. International Transactions in 1985, 72 FED. RESERVE BULL., May 1986, at
291. For a review of current industry trends in international trade, see 1986 INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK,
supra note 6, at 14-21;Johnson, supra, at 287-97.
8. For a discussion of the provisions of the Dep't ofJustice Merger Guidelines which pertain to
international trade and market definition, see Ordover & Willig, Perspectives on Mergers and World
Competition, in ANTITRUST AND REGULATION 201-18 (R. Grieson ed. 1986); Ordover, Transnational
Antitrust and Economics, in ANTITRUST AND TRADE POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 233-48 (B. Hawk
ed. 1985).
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firms when that conduct directly affects the competitiveness of U.S. markets
and the economic well-being of U.S. consumers has not been tested. This
essay demonstrates that economic analysis can contribute to policymaking in
this area but that, for a variety of reasons, this contribution is likely to be
much more limited than in other areas of antitrust policy and practice.
The following major conclusions emerge from the analysis in this essay.
First, in terms of affecting the conduct of foreign firms, U.S. antitrust policy is
most effective where it is least needed and least effective where it is most
needed. In particular, U.S. antitrust policy can in some circumstances reach
allegedly predatory conduct engaged in by a single foreign firm, or by a group
of foreign firms, although it is quite unlikely that successful predation in
international markets will occur. At the same time, U.S. antitrust laws are
almost totally ineffective against cartels formed by foreign firms, or sovereign
governments (for example, OPEC), even though such cartels as a rule harm
U.S. consumers. Finally, these laws are totally ineffective against mergers of
foreign competitors, when such mergers may have substantial adverse effects
on competition in U.S. markets.
Second, given single firm conduct that may violate section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 9 foreign sovereign compulsion should constitute an almost
infallible defense against the application of U.S. antitrust laws.
A third conclusion is that when testing the conduct of foreign firms for
potential violations of section 2 of the Sherman Act, it is most plausible to
assume that these firms behave as profit-maximizing entities. This conclusion
also applies to enterprises which are directly under the control of foreign
governments, for example, Polish golfcart producers. Therefore, such firms,
in selecting their business conduct, should be allowed to avail themselves of
whatever explicit and implicit advantages that have been or are being
conferred on them by their governments.
Fourth, only a most limited foreign sovereign compulsion defense should
be available to foreign cartels comprising non-governmental entities which
may foreseeably and significantly elevate prices in the United States.
Furthermore, both "foreseeability" and "significance" should be explicitly
defined in terms of U.S. market shares, the likely impact on prices, and other
quantitative and qualitative indices. The definitions should be arrived at
through the use of analytic procedures such as those embodied in the United
States Department of Justice Merger Guidelines.' 0 In addition, as a legal
matter, no substantive weight should be given to the question of whether the
effect on competition and consumer welfare in the United States was
intentional.
9. In pertinent part, section 1 of the Sherman Act provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any
other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony. ...
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
10. Department ofJustice Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,024, paras. 2.3-2.4 (1984).
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The fifth conclusion is that unadorned economic theory would favor the
abolition of the soveriegn compulsion defense for cartels constituting
government-controlled enterprises or agencies (such as OPEC), but it must be
conceded that foreign sovereigns cannot be sued in their sovereign capacity.
On the other hand, in the area of restrictive practices that would fall within
the purview of section 1 of the Sherman Act, ' sovereign capacity ought to be
understood rather narrowly and the actions of the sovereign should be
regarded as primarily commercial in nature. This conclusion follows because,
as will be explained below, conduct that may run afoul of section 1 when it has
substantial effects on international commerce cannot be justified as being part
of a legitimate industrial policy.
Finally, the balancing test for claiming jurisdiction in antitrust cases is
likely to remain largely unworkable until some common ground among
trading nations is reached. This common ground must delineate the scope of
legitimate industrial policies. The balancing test must also encompass a
common understanding of the role competition policies are to have in
allocating global economic resources and in affecting competitive dynamics.
In sum, this article takes the view that because U.S. antitrust statutes are
concerned with business conduct and its effects on competition and consumer
welfare in the United States, there must be compelling reasons why these
significant effects should not justify jurisdiction. The reasons are most
compelling for not exercising jurisdiction for effects resulting from single firm
conduct and from impacts on world trade and competition that can be
attributed to the pursuit of legitimate macroeconomic and microeconomic
policy objectives by foreign governments. Reasons not to exercise
jurisdiction are least compelling in relation to non-governmental cartels and,
in fact, strong reasons exist in favor of exercising antitrust jurisdiction against
cartel members.
II
MODES OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND IMPACTS ON COMPETITION
Macroeconomic policies which influence such key economic aggregates as
the inflation rate, interest rates, the unemployment rate, and rates of
exchange unquestionably have a significant impact on world trade and the
relative competitiveness of firms in world markets. These policies provide an
advantage to some firms and a disadvantage to others, and their impact on
competition is a background against which industrial policies and
international rivalry must be assessed.
Industrial policies are designed to influence directly key microeconomic
variables such as the level of employment in a particular sector of the
11. In relevant part, section 2 of the Sherman Act provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of travel
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal ....
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
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economy, industry prices and investment, or expenditures on research and
development. 12 In general, industrial policies affect resource allocation
among various sectors of the economy. As such, these policies selectively
provide an advantage or disadvantage to various industries and sectors of the
economy, and may have a substantial impact on international trade and on the
state of rivalry in world markets. For the sake of discussion, in the rest of this
essay it will be convenient to divide industrial policies into three categories.
These categories, however, cannot be neatly demarcated. Nevertheless,
policies which fall into distinct categories should potentially be given differing
weight in the "balancing test" for jurisdiction.
The first category of industrial policies is comprised of those policies
aimed at correcting recognized market failures. Market failure arises when
competitive markets do not perform in a manner consistent with the
maximization of socioeconomic welfare. 13 An example of one perceived
failure of a market economy is the sluggish disbursement of resources towards
research and development (R&D) activities. Private incentives to invest in
R&D activities are guided by the profit motive. But the profit motive is an
inadequate guide when private investment in R&D yields social benefits which
cannot be appropriated by those who undertake the investment.14 To correct
this type of market failure, direct subsidies by the government might be
necessary. These subsidies provide advantages to firms that receive them, but
they hardly create antitrust concerns.
Another example of market failure occurs when financial markets fail to
provide adequate amounts of risk capital with which to finance new productive
ventures. This type of failure may again require direct involvement by the
government. In Japan, venture capital markets barely exist, and at times the
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) has served the function
that financial markets perform in the United States. 15 Market failure can also
result from the underlying technology that necessarily concentrates a
particular industry, and causes it to fail to behave competitively. In this
instance, appropriate public policy may be difficult to fashion; while breaking
up firms imposes losses in productive efficiency, imperfect competition causes
prices to deviate from the competitive ideal.' 6 Industrial policies may
encourage concentration, hence imperfect competition, in the belief that
more concentrated markets ultimately stimulate dynamic efficiency. The
12. For a careful definition and discussion of industrial policy, see R. LAWRENCE, CAN AMERICA
COMPETE? (1984).
13. See Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 QJ. ECON. 351-79 (1958) (excellent discussion of
various causes of market failure).
14. See Ordover, Economic Foundations and Considerations in Protecting Industrial and Intellectual
Property, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 503-18 (1985) (discusses the antitrust implications of R&D economics).
15. See R. LAWRENCE, supra note 12.
16. Many economists now question whether perfect competition is the appropriate benchmark
against which actual market structures should be compared. They regard it as more illuminating to
inquire whether or not a particular industry is behaving optimally from the social standpoint, given
the nature of its production technology and the structure of demand. See, e.g., W. BAUMOL, J. PANZAR
& R. WILLIG, CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982).
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theory may be that concentration leads to greater R&D investments and faster
technological progress, and thereby contributes to overcoming the type of
market failure described below.
These examples show that markets, in their structure, behavior, and
performance, frequently deviate from the theoretical ideal. When such
deviations arise governmental intervention is justified, at least theoretically.
Correction of such deviations will affect the flow of goods and services in
international trade. Thus, even legitimate industrial policies pursued by one
country and designed to correct market failures could be detrimental to firms
and workers in other countries. Nevertheless, such policies should be
encouraged rather than stymied by expansive antitrust policies.' 7
The second category of industrial policies includes those which respond
directly to various socioeconomic pressures. These pressures are only in part
causally related to some form of market failure. To understand the rationale
for this type of intervention, it is necessary to introduce a public choice model
of the functioning of public policy-making. is In this model, the government,
or rather its elected and unelected officials, is in the position to secure and
maintain supracompetitive profits (monopoly rents) for firms and workers, or
to preserve sectors that could not otherwise return a profit and survive in a
competitive international marketplace.' 9 In some instances these types of
interventionist policies come in response to genuine social concerns that are
indirectly rooted in market failure considerations. For example, when a
decline in a particular industry creates large scale unemployment among
workers with specialized skills (human capital), the socioeconomic costs of
such dislocations may be immense and may warrant some form of industrial
policy intervention. Similarly, some form of intervention may be warranted to
assist the orderly removal of excess capital from the declining sector of the
economy. Unfortunately, more often than not, the particular public policies
chosen are hardly desirable from the standpoint of social efficiency. For
example, distress cartels, which are sometimes embraced in Europe and
Japan, only prolong the difficulties associated with needed adjustments to a
new equilibrium without offering much to society as a whole. 20 It is
unreasonable to expect other countries to share in the costs of inefficient
adjustment policies by condoning distress cartels which have significant
competitive effects abroad. In particular, there is no reason why, as a matter
17. For a discussion of microeconomic politics in the free trade environment, see R. HARRIS,
TRADE, INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION (1985).
18. For an extensive discussion of public choice theory of policy-making, see Mueller, Public
Choice: A Survey, 14J. ECON. LIT. 395-433 (1976).
19. For an excellent discussion of protectionist policies from the vantage point of public choice
theory, see R. BALDWIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF U.S. IMPORT POLICY (1985).
20. For a discussion of the economic inefficiencies associated with distress cartels and the
undesirability of relaxing antitrust standards for declining industries, see M. FRANKENA & P. PAULTER,
ANTITRUST POLICY FOR DECLINING INDUSTRIES (Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics
Working Paper, 1985). Distress cartels are cooperative pricings and production agreements among
independent manufacturers in industries experiencing declining demand and substantial excess
capacity.
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of economic theory, section 1 of the Sherman Act should not apply to such
arrangements, even if the arrangements are fully sanctioned and encouraged
by the respective governments involved. By aggressively using section 1 in
these instances, the United States might encourage foreign governments to
rebate the overcharge and benefit U.S. consumers. 2'
Finally, a third broad category of industrial policies consists of those
designed to transfer the profits from foreign firms and foreign consumer
surplus to domestic firms. 22 These types of policies form the center of the
ongoing debate among policymakers and economists on the economic costs
and benefits of strategic trade and industrial policies. 23 The policies in this
category are also the most difficult to analyze for several reasons. The
theoretical rationale for their implementation is shaky and, at times, they may
appear indistinguishable from the more legitimate industrial policies which
fall into the first two categories listed above. Finally, the net effect of these
policies may be to improve consumer welfare in the importing country and
reduce profits and wages in the import-competing industry.
Three plausible examples will illustrate the policies at issue here. First,
consider the semiconductor industry in which learning-by-doing and scale
economies are significant determinants of the cost of production. 24 In such a
scenario, one country can gain an advantage in international trade by denying
foreign competitors access to its market. This strategy reduces the level of
total sales of foreign firms, raises their unit costs, and makes it more difficult
for them to compete even in their own markets. Note that the domestic firms
of a country that pursues this policy benefit only indirectly from it.
Nevertheless, they gain an international advantage because their relative costs
are lowered. If the advantage is significant, import-competing firms may be
driven out. These firms may find it difficult to return if re-entry barriers are
high, and the surviving firms may be able to elevate prices. No predatory act
by a private party has occurred, but the outcome nevertheless resembles that
which would arise if the exporting firms were engaged in predatory conduct. 25
21. Of course such rebates may prompt the import-competing U.S. industry to clamour for
protection against "dumped" foreign products. However, if dumping were to be defined as pricing
below long-run marginal cost, such protectionist maneuvers are likely to fail more often than not. See
e.g., Ordover, Sykes & Willig, Unfair International Trade Practices, 15J. INT'L L. & POL. 323-38 (1983).
22. Consumers' surplus is defined as the difference between the maximum amount that a
consumer is willing to pay for a given quantity of the product and the amount that he or she actually
pays.
23. The literature on this subject is by now voluminous. A nontechnical collection of papers can
be found in STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS (P. Krugman ed.
1986), and R. HARRIS, supra note 17. For a more technical presentation, see P. KRUGMAN, INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper
No. 1957, 1986); Dixit, Strategic Aspects of Trade Policy (1985) (unpublished manuscript available
from the Law & Contemporary Problems' office).
24. R. Baldwin & P. Krugman, Market Access and International Competition: A Simulation
Study of 16K Random Access Memories (1986) (unpublished manuscript) (analyzes strategic and
industrial policy for the semiconductor industry).
25. Professor Fox, whose grasp of intricate economic arguments often exceeds that of trained
economists, suggests that this strategy also could cause high concentration in excluded countries
because the available market might not be big enough to support more than a few efficient firms and
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In a second example, consider the case of a government which facilitates a
cartel in the domestic market for video cassette recorders (VCRs). Creating a
cartel in the home market makes exports more desirable and also guarantees a
satisfactory overall rate of return on the sales of VCRs, even if export prices
are significantly lower than home prices. These low export prices are
sufficiently competitive to reduce significantly the market share of import-
competing firms. Again, the effect of the industrial policy may be similar to
that which would occur if private firms had engaged in predation. Provided
that the exporters had not sold below their marginal cost, however, the actual
price would not be predatory.
The final example alludes to governmental policies which facilitate,
encourage, and sanction export cartels. These cartels transfer consumer
surplus from abroad (that is, they lower the foreign consumer surplus) and
transform it into higher profits and wages in exporting domestic industries. In
some limited instances these cartels may be justified on efficiency grounds.
For example, exporting firms might set up joint marketing operations in order
to avoid costly duplication of distribution facilities. In many other instances,
however, such a justification is unavailable. In these instances the rationale
for the cartels becomes transparent: It is good to extract profits from abroad
at the expense of foreign consumers because our "nationalistic" evaluation of
economic well-being does not place value on the well-being of consumers
abroad.2 6
This section has outlined various categories of industrial policy.
Governmental policies significantly influence business activity in advanced
economies, as well as in newly developed countries (NDCs) and less
developed countries (LDCs). These policies are governed by a variety of
objectives, including the commercial, the more broadly socioeconomic, or the
blatantly geopolitical. It is a recognized principle of international law that
each country should have a sovereign right to influence and regulate
economic activity in its own territory. 27 However, in the open world
economy, such policies have effects beyond national borders: They impose
costs and confer benefits upon, and at times clash with the policies of, other
countries. This essay seeks to establish guidelines for the resolution of these
potential conflicts.
could lead to cartel-type behavior. This outcome could be facilitated by the excluded country's
protectionist policies.
26. Thus, I strongly disagree with the views of James Atwood expressed at the Conference
which seem to suggest that there should be a mutual forbearance among trading nations with respect
to their home-grown export cartels. In light of the finding that generally there is no efficiency
rationale for such cartels, the opposite stance is more justified. I would, of course, permit an
efficiency defense. Douglas Rosenthal, Esq., pointed out to me that governmental policies that
merely sanction cartels might be more effectively attacked using the provisions of section 301 of the
1974 Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1980 & Supp. 1987). See also Atwood, Antitrust and Export Cartels,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1987, at 153.
27. For a convenient summary, see I W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS
43-164 (1982); i P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw 254-78 (1978).
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III
INDUSTRIAL POLICIES AND PRIVATE ACTIONS
For simplicity, business conduct will be divided into two categories:
(1) conduct aimed at garnering an additional market share from firms in the
importing country and maintaining this higher market share over time,
potentially to the detriment of the importing country's consumers; and
(2) conduct designed to reduce competition through implicit or explicit
collusion. Stated another way, conduct in the first category would be
scrutinized under section 2 of the Sherman Act to determine whether it
constitutes either monopolization or an attempt to monopolize. 28 The second
category includes conduct that may run afoul of section 1 of the Sherman
Act.29 Note that mergers and acquisitions involving foreign firms, which
might violate section 7 of the Clayton Act, are plainly beyond the reach of
U.S. law. 30
Regardless of which category the specific conduct fits, the first and major
question is whether the activities of firms is in accordance with a government
policy. 3' This question does not have a simple, precise answer. It is quite
plausible that the government has not rigorously defined its policy, or some
parameters may have been intentionally left vague, and thus open to
misinterpretation. Furthermore, in the desire to shield their firms from
prosecution, governments may provide ex post facto rationalizations for why
they believe the activities to be within the contemplated scope of
governmental policies. The firms themselves, however, may strive
strategically to use the shield of government compulsion. These examples
demonstrate the importance of defining how much weight should be given to
the defense of foreign sovereign compulsion. Determining the weight of the
defense should also not be divorced from the following two considerations.
First, is the allegedly illegal conduct predatory or is it collusive (leaving aside
collusive conduct designed to facilitate predatory activities)? Second, which
of the three broad categories of industrial policies is being invoked as a
defense?
The need to determine which of the three industrial policies is at issue has
been developed in Section II. Industrial policies designed to rectify a well-
recognized market failure are generally desirable not only from the
chauvinistic vantage point of the country pursuing those policies, but also
from the vantage point of global efficiency and resource allocation.
Consequently, these policies should be encouraged. Industrial policies aimed
28. See supra note 8.
29. See supra note 10.
30. Some believe that the more dependent the United States becomes on imports of foreign
products, the more likely it is that such mergers, if they were to occur, would be harmful to U.S.
consumers. In other words, the finding of a "world market" for the purposes of merger assessment
may make it easier for two U.S. firms to satisfy the Merger Guidelines but it also brings out the
constraining role of foreign firms on the conduct of firms selling to U.S. consumers.
31. Assume that it already has been demonstrated that there is a sufficient nexus between the
foreign government's policy, conduct of firms, and the impact on U.S. competition and consumers.
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at relieving some socioeconomic burdens, such as excess sectoral
unemployment or superfluous capital, are likely to be even more protected
under the sovereign immunity doctrine than are policies designed to correct
market failure.
The analysis developed here suggests, however, that greatest protection
should be extended to industrial policies which correct explicit market
failures. Lesser protection should be accorded to direct interventions that
attempt to cure socioeconomic ills. These policies are generally poorly
designed and frequently transfer costs from the country which pursues them
to innocent third parties. These interventions also redistribute burdens
within the country. Yet, it must be recognized that it would be a transgression
to prohibit any government from (implicitly) taxing its citizenry to finance its
agricultural policy, for example. When the effects of a country's domestic
economic policies spill abroad, a legitimate extraterritorial interest emerges:
There should be no taxation without representation. Nevertheless,
"representation" through the claims of antitrust jurisdiction appears to be an
inappropriate and ineffective venue.
Finally, policies which seem merely to redistribute consumer surplus
rather than correct market failure should be accorded the least protection.
The United States should be most restrictive in extending the compulsion
defense to firm conduct which is allegedly in accordance with nationalistic
policies designed primarily to redistribute world profits and consumers'
surplus. This is especially the case if the United States is a primary or
important target of these policies and the impact on it is substantial.
Within each category of industrial policies, the most expansive protection
under the foreign compulsion defense ought to be accorded to those actions
which have the alleged effect of monopolizing or attempting to monopolize
the relevant U.S. market. Several reasons support this position. The
likelihood of successful predation is considered by many economists to be
rather low in most realistic market scenarios, 32 and the author believes that
the likelihood of successful predation is probably even lower when the alleged
predator is an exporting firm domiciled abroad. Moreover, the United States
can protect its import-competing industries against low prices by means of
diverse measures pertaining directly to international trade. Such measures as
tariffs and countervailing duties are an accepted part of the world trading
order and are guided by the principles of free trade embodied in the rules of
GATT.33 As of now, there is less international agreement on the proper
32. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (198 1) (expounds
the view that successful predation is almost never likely and hence prohibitions against it are
unnecessary and tend to be counterproductive). A more balanced view is presented inJ. Ordover &
G. Saloner, Predation, Monopolization and Antitrust (1987) (unpublished manuscript) (forthcoming
in R. SCHMALENSEE & R. WILLIG, HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1987)).
33. The General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) is an international organization
devoted to the promotion of trade in general and reducing barriers to trade in particular. For a good
non-technical discussion of GATT and other international and regional trade organizations, see M.
KREININ, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, 331-49 (5th ed. 1987).
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scope and role of antitrust policies, even though in this regard the divergence
between the United States and some of our trading partners is less than it
used to be. Finally, the difficulties in applying such standard tests of
predatory behavior as the Areeda-Turner test 34 are most likely to be
compounded when applied to foreign firms whose costs are frequently
impossible to ascertain.
The above considerations justifying expansive protection for predatory
practices under the foreign compulsion rule do not apply to price fixing and
other cartels. Whether the price or other terms and conditions of sale have
been fixed is a factual inquiry whose success does not turn on such intricate
questions as whether or not the sale price exceeds reasonably anticipated
marginal costs. Cartels are more pernicious than are predatory strategies
because at no time do they confer benefits on consumers. Unlike predatory
conduct which is difficult to distinguish from normal strategic interactions,
collusion is the opposite of competition and cannot be mistaken for it.
Depression cartels are an inefficient method of dealing with an industry's
transition to a lower level of equilibrium output. There is no reason why
other countries should bear the costs of such inefficient policies when other
policy instruments are available to handle the task.35 Standard remedies in
international trade, such as tariffs and countervailing duties, cannot address
the problem of elevated prices; instead, they only exacerbate the inefficiencies
caused by above-competitive prices.
Despite the arguments against cartels, a very limited sovereign compulsion
defense should be available to private firms comprising a cartel. It is of course
possible to argue that such a defense should not be available because, in the
absence of the defense, firms may be quite reluctant to participate in such
cartels. If, however, firms are hesitant to participate in this type of collusion,
then foreign governments may become less willing to form such cartels. If
cartels are made undesirable, the cure may be worse than the disease. It may,
for instance, lead to inefficient reallocation of assets, nationalization of
productive assets, or export tariffs. These practices may prove more difficult
to counter than a cartel agreement.
Government cartels present the most formidable dilemma. There is no
question that such cartels are detrimental to the global allocation of
resources. Yet these cartels, typically used to fix and stabilize the prices of
raw materials and agricultural products, are in essence immune to attack by
U.S. antitrust laws. Here "simpleminded" prescriptions of economics
inevitably run up against the accepted principles of international law, and
ultimately must recognize politics as an overriding principle. Consequently,
attempts to reach a diplomatic solution to the problems posed by government
34. Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88
HARV. L. REV. 697 (1976).
35. More effective policies may include direct payments to owners of excess capacity, retaining
programs for affected employees, or tolling agreements.
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cartels are more likely in the long run to bring about global efficiency than
noncooperative, adversarial antitrust litigation.
Economic analysis therefore suggests that the sovereign compulsion
defense should be interpreted broadly in monopolization cases, especially
when the allegedly anticompetitive conduct is broadly construed; such
interpretation would encourage the pursuit of microeconomic policies
designed to cure market failure or to facilitate some socioeconomic objectives.
In price fixing cases, the defense should be interpreted narrowly in order to
discourage firms from entering into such collusive agreements and hiding
behind the shield of sovereign compulsion. This view is reinforced by the fact
that collusive agreements of this kind are not consistent with legitimate
industrial policies but are, most likely, designed to usurp consumer surplus. 36
IV
THE BALANCING TEST
When sovereign interests clash, it is reasonable to resort to a balancing of
equities. Balancing is a rather empty prescription for ascertaining
jurisdiction, however, unless there exists some idea of the appropriate weights
to be assigned to conflicting interests. Assigning a very low weight to the
genuine interests of the foreign sovereign is a very crude position. In fact, it
may provoke retaliation by the country whose interests have been
undervalued. Retaliation will consist of the slighted state assigning zero
weight to the interests of the first country. As a result, both countries in the
long run are damaged more than they would be if the first sovereign had
initially used a more appropriate balancing test. Hence, after assessing
potential strategic interactions among nations in the international arena, it is
clear that purely chauvinistic weights are never optimal.
How much positive weight should be assigned to foreign interests in the
balancing test? Such weights should not be specified ex ante, primarily because
inflexible weights might only hamper conflict resolution. Some guidelines are
desirable, however. This essay has already offered some preliminary
guidelines by positing that foreign sovereigns should not be penalized for
policies which remedy market failures and efficiently pursue vital
socioeconomic objectives. These objectives do not, however, include
strategic industrial policies designed to transfer profits and consumer surplus
from abroad.
Balancing enters, albeit through a back door, at the stage when "the
relative significance and foreseeability of the effects of the conduct on the
United States.. ."37 is compared with effects abroad. Why such a comparison
should be important is unclear. Surely, if the effect in the United States is
36. One caveat may be mentioned here: Competitive industry may extract the natural resource
too fast for the good of the national welfare. Sovereign compulsion in this instance may be
necessary. See P. DASGUPTA, THE CONTROL OF RESOURCES (1982).
37. The Reagan Administration's Package to Congress for Revision of Federal Antitrust Laws,
50 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1253, at S-14 (Feb. 20, 1986).
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substantial in absolute terms, irrespective of the effect abroad, this ought to
be enough to claim jurisdiction. To see why the relative distribution of effects
is largely irrelevant, consider the case where the foreign country is perfectly
willing to accept the burdens of constructing a cartel in a vital industry on the
belief that additional profits from abroad justify the policy. 38 It is preferable
to adopt some objective threshold criteria for determining the economic
impact of the allegedly illegal conduct on competition in the United States.
From this perspective, the more substantial the potential harm is to the
United States, the lower is the weight to be assigned the conflicting interest of
the foreign sovereign.
V
CONCLUSION
Economists have been reluctant to venture into the unchartered waters of
international antitrust jurisdiction issues. This essay may convince the reader
that such reluctance is justified. Some positive insights, -however, do emerge
from this tentative first step. Most significantly, this analysis demonstrates
that very few advantages will result from aggressive exercise ofjurisdiction in
cases alleging violations of section 2 of the Sherman Act. At the same time,
claiming jurisdiction in section 1 cases promises clear economic benefits.
Accordingly, the defense of sovereign compulsion should be construed as
narrowly as possible in a section 1 case. In fact, there is a strong argument for
denying such defenses to private firms in order to discourage participation in
such pernicious arrangements as cartels and price-fixing. Unfortunately, such
an unyielding position may violate established principles of international law
and may potentially lead to strategic responses more destructive than the
cartel problem itself.3 9 Nevertheless, the possibility of potential strategic
responses is not likely enough to preclude an expansive jurisdiction policy in
applying U.S. antitrust laws.
38. For an example of such calculations albeit in a somewhat different context, see Ordover &
Willig, supra note 8.
39. This is especially the case if one is of the opinion that cartels have the tendency to quickly
collapse because individual profit incentives lead cartel members to chisel on the agreement.
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